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INTRODUCTION
There is an understanding of an inverse relationship between tax rates and real capital
allocation (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon,
2001). As such, policymakers across jurisdictions have historically granted tax cuts to firms to
reduce their effective tax rates (ETR) and thereby attract capital. There is a growing interest in
understanding these policies’ impact on workers and on whether they create welfare beyond the
intervention period (Neumark and Simpson, 2014). Puerto Rico’s Act 20-2012 and Act 22-2012
present an opportunity to evaluate the contribution of such a policy to a region’s economy.
As a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto Rico retains a degree of political
sovereignty and fiscal autonomy which make it subject to unique tax treatment. Both the Federal
and Puerto Rican governments have historically used tax policy to attract investment and create
jobs in the island (GAO, 2006; Act 60-2019). This paper focuses on the impact of the Export
Services Act (Act 20-2012) and the Individual Investors Act (Act 22-2012), a set of tax breaks
created in January 2012 which grant preferential tax treatment to export-oriented service firms
and to high-net-worth individuals who relocate to Puerto Rico. Combined, Acts 20 and 22 sought
to create a favorable business environment for firms to export their services to outside markets
and thereby stimulate the local economy (Tribuna Puerto Rico, 2012).
Nearly a decade after their creation, Acts 20 and 22 have become increasingly relevant to
policy conversations in the island. Limited oversight, a lack of insights into the programs’
effectiveness, and socioeconomic disparities led the Senate of Puerto Rico to evaluate their
elimination in 2021 (Noticel, 2021). Despite the substantial role they play in the government’s
economic development agenda, the literature regarding Acts 20 and 22 is lacking. Most studies
focus on the incentives’ socioeconomic context and their effectiveness in empowering local
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small and medium businesses (Aponte-Garcia and Orengo-Serra, 2020; Crandall, 2019).
However, limited research has been done on their overall impact on the economy and workers. A
government-commissioned report finds they created over 36,000 jobs and brought over $1.2
billion in private investment (Estudios Tecnicos, 2019), though these findings largely rely on
firms’ self-reported data. Caraballo-Cueto (2021)’s econometric analysis finds that by 2017,
employment and output were 3% and 2% higher because of Acts 20 and 22. As such, the
literature provides some evidence that these incentives have stimulated the local economy.
My paper makes a data-driven contribution to the literature and to the ongoing debate
regarding the effectiveness of tax incentives in Puerto Rico. It builds on prior studies by
leveraging data at the county-industry level for the period between 2005 and 2016, using
synthetic difference-in-differences on Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
data. I find that Acts 20 and 22 caused a 2.6% increase in overall employment in 2012, but my
point estimates provide no statistically significant evidence of job creation in any of the
following years. Furthermore, I find that wages in 2015 and 2016 decreased by -6.5% and -7.2%
respectively. Therefore, my point estimates do not provide evidence suggesting more than a
minimal impact on island-wide economic activity.
Given the type of investors and businesses these incentives attract, I also evaluate their
impact on the professional, scientific, and technical services industry (NAICS 54). On one hand,
NAICS 54 includes services often used by high-net-worth individuals attracted by Act 22 (e.g.
legal and accounting). The most relevant consideration, however, is Act 20’s role in
incentivizing export-oriented firms in areas such as law, accounting, and consulting. I find that
by 2015–the year in which the policies’ impact on services peaked–Acts 20 and 22 had
collectively increased per capita employment by 23.1% and per capita annual wages by 19.7%.
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Therefore, while I find evidence suggesting Acts 20 and 22 were successful in
incentivizing economic activity in the service industry, my point estimates fail to suggest more
than a minimal impact on overall economic activity in Puerto Rico.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Tax Policy and Firm Activity
There is a wide range of literature on how fiscal incentives affect firm location and
planning decisions. Grubert and Mutti (1991) address the question of whether multinational
corporations (MNC) transfer income to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions and whether taxes and
tariffs affect MNC location and investment decisions. They use the U.S. Commerce
Department’s 1983 Benchmark Survey for manufacturing affiliates of U.S. MNCs in 33
countries. Regressing firm reported profitability and capital allocation on statutory tax rates, they
find that companies allocate more real capital and report higher pre-tax income in locations with
lower tax rates, a practice known as profit shifting. Hines and Rice (1994) carry out a similar
analysis using 1982 U.S. Commerce Department Data for non-bank affiliates of U.S. parent
companies in 41 tax haven countries. Like Grubert and Mutti (1991), they find that corporations
report higher profits and locate more factors of production in lower-tax jurisdictions.
Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001) revisit the question of MNC investment decisions
and tax policy to explore whether advancements in technology and shifts in trade policy have
increased firms’ tax sensitivity. The authors use U.S. Treasury Department tax returns for parent
corporations’ manufacturing controlled foreign corporations (CFC) between 1984 and 1992 to
explore whether sensitivity has changed over time. This is something that prior papers, which
rely on single-period data (e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994), were unable to
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do. The authors find that decisions of real capital allocation have become more sensitive over
time (elasticity changes from 1.5 in 1984 to 2.8 in 1992). More recent papers have challenged
these findings, proposing that the sensitivity of MNC real activity (measured through fixed
capital, assets, employment, compensation, and number of affiliates) to tax rates has remained
stable since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Mutti and Ohrn, 2019).
Tax competition has increasingly become a topic of contention between countries.
Policymakers understand the inverse relationship between tax rates and capital allocation and
have historically protected their market share via tax cuts, pushing ETRs down even further.
Altshuler and Grubert (2005) study this phenomenon and explore whether changes in countries’
ETRs are due to tax competition. They use U.S. Treasury Data for 1992 to 2002 to evaluate
whether losing U.S. capital market share prompts countries to cut their ETRs. They find that,
between 1992 and 1998, attempts to defend market share are the main cause of ETR cuts.
Between 1998 and 2002, however, corporate tax planning (facilitated by loosened regulations in
high-tax host countries) become a major driver of lower ETRs. Acknowledging the “race to the
bottom” in terms of ETRs, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen proposed a global minimum
corporate tax rate in 2021 (Associated Press, 2021). This debate led the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to implement a global minimum corporate tax
rate of 15% in November 2021.

Place-Based Policies
There is a growing interest in place-based policies instituted by governments to promote
growth in underperforming jurisdictions. The rationale behind place-based policies is that, by
targeting geographic regions inhabited by disadvantaged residents, policymakers can strengthen
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their labor markets and ultimately tackle market failures (Neumark and Simpson, 2014). Beyond
simply looking at increases in wages and jobs, the place-based policy literature looks at other
factors and quality of life indicators to assess the impact on welfare. In their literature review of
these studies, Neumark and Simpson (2014) find that research on place-based policies generally
fail to provide evidence of sustainable long-term growth and of welfare gains beyond the
intervention period. Moretti (2012) concurs and emphasizes that the outcome of interest should
not be whether the policies create jobs during the intervention but whether they create effects
that are large enough to become self-sustaining. These emerge as questions that one must
consider when evaluating place-based policies’ effects on both economic activity and workers.

Puerto Rico
§936 of the Internal Revenue Code
Income sourced in U.S. possessions has historically been subject to unique tax treatment.
Starting with §262 of the Revenue Act of 1921, the income earned by American firms in U.S.
possessions was completely exempt from federal taxation (Dick, 2015). The Tax Reform Act of
1976 revised the tax treatment of U.S. possessions income and created the U.S. Possessions
Corporation Tax Credit (§936). By transitioning from an exemption regime to a credit system,
the government intended to increase business activity in U.S. possessions.1 In its original form,
§936 allowed American MNCs which operated affiliate companies in Puerto Rico to offset their
federal tax bill by the full amount of taxes they would have owed on income sourced in the

1

In general, when American firms repatriate foreign income to the United States, the tax rate on their foreign
income equals the difference between the U.S. and the foreign country’s tax rates; therefore, foreign tax exemptions
have no effect on a firm’s total tax burden after repatriating income. By granting a tax credit amounting to federal
taxes owed on their possessions income rather than taxes paid on this income, Congress made it possible for
American MNCs to benefit from tax incentives enacted in US possessions (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2006).
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island. To be eligible for §936 tax credits, firms had to prove that at least 80% of their gross
income in the prior three years was sourced in a U.S. possession and that at least 50% of their
gross income in the past three years came from active business and trade. In essence, the U.S.
Possessions Tax Credit enabled §936 firms to operate tax-free in Puerto Rico.
Most of the literature on Puerto Rican tax policy focuses on the effects of §936. Given its
profit shifting potential, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) study the decision-making process of §936
companies. They develop a joint decision model for capital allocation and profit reporting for
U.S. corporations using 1987 tax return data for §936 affiliates in the manufacturing industry.
Their simulation finds that nearly half of §936 firms are in Puerto Rico exclusively due to tax
shifting purposes, and this number goes up to 80% among pharmaceutical firms.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, which created §936, was amended various times to address
these profit shifting concerns. By the early 1990s, policymakers were questioning the benefits of
§936 firms’ operations in Puerto Rico. For example, they noted that in 1989, the average tax
benefit for each employee in the chemicals industry was $69,800, while the average
compensation in the industry was only $32,000. Government reports (e.g. GAO, 1993)
evaluating further revisions to §936 estimated that job losses pertaining to these changes would
be at least partially offset by other forms of alternative employment. Such reports nevertheless
emphasized the difficulty of estimating the overall effect on the Puerto Rican economy due to a
lack of firm-specific information. In 1996, the Clinton Administration eliminated §936, with a
ten-year phaseout period concluding in 2006.
Studies conducted after the phaseout allow us to take a closer look at the role §936 played
in firm operations. An event study examining stock returns around the announcement of the §936
repeal finds that, on average, exposed firms experienced a cumulative abnormal return of -1.4%
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on the 12 days after the repeal’s announcement (Garrett and Suarez Serrato, 2019). This suggests
that firms cannot easily switch from Puerto Rico to other low-tax jurisdictions and that the repeal
of §936 reduced firm value on average. Although §936’s repeal was supposed to benefit the U.S.
economy by limiting profit shifting, it had unintended adverse effects on the U.S. mainland
activities of exposed firms (Suarez Serrato, 2018). By looking at firm-level data from Compustat,
the National Establishment Time Series, and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,
Suarez Serrato (2018) measures how firms adjusted to the elimination of §936 and its labor
market effects. He finds that §936 firms reduced their global investment by 10% and their
mainland U.S. employment by 6.7%. He also finds that labor markets most exposed to §936
firms experienced decreases in wages, employment, and home value and became increasingly
reliant on government transfers such as unemployment payments.
Other studies shed light on the role §936 played in the Puerto Rican economy. Feliciano
and Green (2017) compile data from 1982 to 2012 from the IRS Statistics of Income for U.S.
Possessions Corporations, the U.S. Economic Census, and Junta de Planificacion of Puerto Rico.
They use these to understand how §936’s repeal affected the number of manufacturing
establishments, value added, employment, and wages in the island. The authors use a differencein-differences regression with three different control groups.2 They also examine the relationship
between the number of firms filing for tax credits and the value of those credits. Their findings
do not suggest a significant relationship between credits granted and employment/wages,
validating some of the concerns presented regarding the effectiveness of §936 as a conduit for

2

The first group is the aggregate U.S. economy. The second group consists of Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon,
while the third group includes New Jersey as well. They include Indiana and North Carolina since they have the two
largest manufacturing shares of state GDP in the country. They include Oregon since a substantial share of workers
are employed in the food and beverage industry. New Jersey is included due to a large share of employment in
chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
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economic development. They also find that eliminating §936 reduced manufacturing wages by
16.7% and the number of establishments by a number ranging from 18.7% to 28%. While the
authors do find a large reduction in the number of establishments in the island, it is notably lower
than the near-50% decrease estimated by Grubert and Slemrod (1998). The authors mention that
their results are sensitive to the states included in the control group, suggesting that future studies
must be careful when creating a counterfactual Puerto Rican economy. To tackle such issues, I
use inverse probability of treatment weighting and synthetic controls to create my counterfactual.

Economic Downturn and Fiscal Crisis
While the repeal of §936 does coincide with the beginning of Puerto Rico’s economic
contraction, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between these two events. Studies
(e.g. Feliciano and Green, 2017) find that the repeal represented a significant adverse shock to
the economy, but a number of other factors have contributed to stagnation. For instance, high
input costs (such as energy, water, transportation, and labor) disincentivize economic activity
(Krueger, Teja, and Wolfe, 2015). Even if it is difficult to pinpoint a specific cause, Puerto
Rico’s prolonged economic contraction is notable. Between 2005 and 2016, real GDP in the
island experienced year-on-year declines in all but two years, representing a total decrease of 9%
(GAO, 2018). As shown in Figure 1, during this period, employment in Puerto Rico grew at a
substantially slower rate than in the U.S., with the island consistently losing jobs on a year-onyear basis while the mainland economy recovered from the Great Recession.
The decline in economic activity had far-reaching socioeconomic consequences.
Outmigration in the island increased substantially: population decreased by 12.8% between 2004
and 2017 (GAO, 2018). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, average unemployment
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between 2005 and 2017 also reached 13.1%, substantially higher than the national average of
6.5%. The worsening economic condition also coincides with Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis. Faced
with fiscal deficits, the government balanced its budget by issuing bonds. By 2015, public debt
exceeded over $70 billion and, unable to make interest payments, the government defaulted on
over $1.5 billion of obligations (GAO, 2018). Congress responded to this situation with the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which created
the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) with the power to enact fiscal controls
and oversight mechanisms (GAO, 2018). This represents a continued push towards greater
accountability over the island’s finances.

Acts 20 and 22
As discussed above, Puerto Rico’s economy has historically suffered from high input
costs that have contributed to stagnation. The government has minimized the cost of doing
business in the island and increased firm profitability through fiscal policy, opting to grant
corporate and capital gain tax exemptions. However, economists (e.g. Krueger, Teja, and Wolfe,
2015) have taken a critical stance on Puerto Rico’s reliance on tax policy to attract investments,
noting that such strategies come at the detriment of the tax system and the budget. To
contextualize, as shown in Figure 2, corporate taxes generally represent approximately 20% of
the state government’s tax revenues, making decreases in corporate collections highly
significant. Nevertheless, the government’s economic development agenda has historically
incorporated such policies in place of structural reform.
In January 2012, Governor Luis Fortuño signed the Export Services Act (Act 20-2012)
and the Individual Investors Act (Act 22-2012). Act 20 intends to achieve sustainable economic
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development by converting Puerto Rico into an international hub for scientific research and the
exportation of goods and services (Act 20-2012).3 It offers a 4% corporate income tax rate, a
100% exemption on the distribution of earnings and profits, and a 60% exemption on municipal
taxes (among other tax breaks) to firms that export their goods and services; corporate income
sourced in the island remains exempt from federal taxes.4 Meanwhile, Act 22 intends to stimulate
the local economy by attracting individuals with substantial purchasing power (Act 22-2012). It
grants investors a 100% exemption from local taxes on dividend and interest income; individual
income sourced in the island remains exempt from federal taxes. The decrees carry various
requirements: eligible investors must not have been residents of Puerto Rico in the 15 years
preceding the Act’s creation; they must live in the island at least 183 days a year; and they must
purchase a local property to serve as their main residence.5 Combined, the goal of Acts 20 and 22
is to promote economic development and create jobs by attracting individual capital and
producing an attractive business environment to export services (Tribuna Puerto Rico, 2012).
Acts 20 and 22 have become an increasingly relevant area of study. At first glance, it
might seem like they are succeeding: as shown in Figure 3, employment in the professional,
scientific, and technical services sector (NAICS 54) has rapidly grown and was 20% higher in
2016 than in 2011. However, the incentives are controversial due to substantial socioeconomic
inequality in the island. Politicians have denounced the relocation of high-net-worth individuals
“at the expense of the working class,” and the elimination of these incentives came under the
consideration of the Senate of Puerto Rico in early 2021 (Noticel, 2021). The costliness of the
3

For further reading on the sensitivity of highly skilled workers’ location decisions to taxes, see Moretti and Wilson
(2015), who find that high-income private-sector scientists are sensitive to changes in corporate and individual taxes.
4
For further reading on the sensitivity of corporate investment and employee compensation to dividend taxes, see
Yagan (2015), who does not find significant evidence of an effect different from zero.
5
The eligibility requirement for Act 22 has been amended on multiple occasions, most recently through Act 602019. As of December 2021, only investors who were not residents of Puerto Rico between 2009 and 2019 can
request an Act 22 decree.
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government’s reliance on fiscal incentives has also come under fire, and in December 2021, the
Financial Oversight and Management Board explicitly requested the Puerto Rican government to
only retain programs that yield clear benefits (Jaresko, 2021). However, until as recently as
2019–when the Incentive Code of 2019 (Act 60-2019) was created–there were no mechanisms in
place to quantify the costs of these programs. The initial Puerto Rico Tax Expenditure Report
finds they collectively cost nearly $20 billion per year, over three times higher than expected
(OAEF, 2019). Acts 20 and 22 are particularly notable. In FY2017, they respectively cost $111.3
million and $29 million in foregone tax revenue, making them the third and fourth most
expensive programs.6 While the costs are substantial, there is limited literature evaluating the
potential benefits of Acts 20 and 22.
Some studies have discussed the incentives’ socioeconomic implications. Aponte-Garcia
and Orengo-Serra (2020) propose that Puerto Rico has historically disregarded the need to
stimulate local small- and medium-enterprises (SMEs) and has instead focused on attracting
American firms. They acknowledge that Act 20 does favor exports produced by local SMEs but
argue that it does not strengthen local supply chains and platforms. Another paper criticizes Acts
20 and 22 for their role in attracting investors who wish to convert Puerto Rico into a “cryptoutopia” (Crandall, 2019). The same paper argues that the Acts do little to incentivize local
hiring, instead allowing investors to relocate to the island while outsourcing expensive labor
costs. Economist Joseph Stiglitz has also been critical of Act 22, describing it as a “negative
externality” that raises the cost of living at locals’ expense (Maglione, 2021).
6

Act 73-2008 (Economic Incentives for the Development of Puerto Rico) cost $15.7 billion. This incentive mainly
targets manufacturing and other capital-intensive firms operating in the industrial sector. My study does not explore
the impact of Act 73-2008, since prior studies on Puerto Rico have already explored how tax policy affects
manufacturing activity in the island.
Act 14-2017 (Benefits for Qualified Physicians) cost $126.6 million. It incentivizes physicians who remain in the
island to tackle a brain drain of medical professionals. Despite its cost, the main goal of Act 14 is not economic
development, so I do not explore their impact in this paper.
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Despite these concerns, there is a limited range of literature evaluating the economic
merits of these policies. Government-commissioned reports claim that they are beneficial for
Puerto Rico and that they’ve resulted in over 36,000 jobs created and over $1.2 billion in private
investments (Servicios Tecnicos, 2019). However, these findings mostly rely on firms’ selfreported data. Caraballo-Cueto (2021) uses a Bayesian Structural Time Series Model (BSM) and
synthetic controls to evaluate Acts 20 and 22 and finds a modest positive impact. His BSM finds
that the Economic Activity Index (EAI) in 2017 was 2.6% higher than in the counterfactual state,
while the synthetic control finds an increase of 1.4%; the study also finds that 3.3% of the jobs in
Puerto Rico in 2017 were created by Acts 20 and 22. The economic literature, therefore, finds
evidence of a moderate but positive impact on economic activity.
My study builds on prior work by using different econometric controls and other data
sources to evaluate the effectiveness of Acts 20 and 22. Caraballo-Cueto (2021) largely relies on
state-level EAIs and employment as the outcomes of interest. Furthermore, he uses state-level
data to generate a synthetic control for the Puerto Rican economy. My paper proposes two main
improvements to these methods. Firstly, it leverages local labor market data to evaluate the
policies’ impact on observable outcomes directly targeted by the polices. In its declaration of
motives, Act 20 states job creation and attracting business establishments to Puerto Rico as two
of its main goals; it also notes that policymakers drew inspiration from other countries’ success
in increasing wages in the service sector (Act 20-2012). Thus, I consider establishment counts
and wages as additional high-quality data points that can be used to evaluate the policies’
success. Furthermore, traditional synthetic controls only allow estimating a treatment effect on a
singular treated unit. To leverage county-industry panel data and control for county-industry
effects and time-varying industry trends, I use synthetic difference-in-differences, which also
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allows me to estimate treatment effects over a panel containing multiple treated units. My study
ultimately fails to find evidence suggesting that Acts 20 and 22 stimulated overall economic
activity, though the point estimates provide statistically significant evidence of increased
employment and wages in the professional, scientific, and technical services sector.

DISCUSSION
Data
This paper combines various data sources to explore economic activity in Puerto Rico.
The data is largely composed of Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) annual
statistics for private employment. The sample is limited to observations between 2005 and 2016
to avoid noise due to natural disasters in 2017 and 2020. In addition, it includes population
estimates from the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Program (PEP) for all counties and
states in the United States as well as for Puerto Rico and its municipios. The data is subset into
two panels: the county-industry data (at the 2-digit NAICS level) and the county-summary data
(aggregating all industries within each county). I balance the panel to only include counties and
county-industries for which data is available for all years between 2005 and 2016 and for which
there are no omissions in employment levels, establishment counts, and wages.

Baseline Model
I first study the effects of Acts 20 and 22 on the Puerto Rican economy. The findings
from this model capture whether the intervention increased economic activity in Puerto Rico
across all industries. This section presents the methods I use to build the model, the relevant
findings, and robustness checks.
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Methods
This paper relies on the generalization of synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID)
analyses proposed by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). There are two main methods often employed in
the policy evaluation literature: difference-in-differences (DID) and synthetic controls (SC).
Generally, DID is used in scenarios where multiple units of observation are treated. DID relies
on the assumption that the treated and untreated groups moved in parallel prior to the
intervention and that these differences can be addressed through entity and time fixed effects.
Meanwhile, SC applies weights to untreated groups to match the pre-intervention outcomes of a
single treated unit (Arkhangelsky et. al, 2021). SDID re-weights non-treated units to match preintervention outcomes and incorporates fixed effects to allow inference over many treated units.
For the weighting process, I use inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) as
proposed by Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003). Firstly, I use a logistic regression model to
estimate the probability of a county being located in Puerto Rico immediately prior to the
intervention. The logit model matches on 2011 economic activity in the county (as measured by
per-capita annual wages, annual establishments, and employment levels), prior trends in these
variables (growth between 2005 and 2011), and industry mix (measured as percentage of
employment in manufacturing, services, and food services in each county).7 I create weights
equal to the reciprocal of the probability of being in Puerto Rico for counties in the island and
equal to the reciprocal of the probability of not being in the island for non-Puerto Rico counties.
To minimize the effect of artificial outliers on the results, I follow Cole and Hernan (2008) and
winsorize my weights at the 1% and 99% level to achieve a mean weight that is close to one.

7

I match on manufacturing (NAICS 31) and food services (NAICS 72) since they have been of historical
importance to the Puerto Rican economy and are two of the top five industries in terms of employment level in
2011. I include service (NAICS 54) given its relevance to the incentives.
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I apply the county-level weights to all industries within a given county to estimate a
weighted-least-squares regression. I then regress the natural logs of per-capita employment,
annual establishment, and employment levels for each county-industry on interaction terms
between binary variables for being in Puerto Rico and dummy variables for each year. This
allows me to estimate the percentage difference change in the outcome in Puerto Rico due to the
intervention, relative to the counterfactual state. The outcomes are scaled to natural logs, which
makes all point estimates interpretable as percentage changes from 2011 values. I include fixed
effects for all county-industries and year-industries to capture unobserved variation at the
county-industry level as well as time-varying industry trends. I cluster standard errors at the
county-industry level and set alpha at the conventional level of 0.05.
The underlying assumption is that, by matching counties in Puerto Rico to non-treated
counties on a set of observable attributes, I can create a counterfactual state that reflects the
Puerto Rican economy in the absence of these incentives. However, since my findings are
contingent on accurately modeling the counterfactual state, there are potential weaknesses I must
address. Firstly, since I calculate growth rates from 2005 to 2011, these might capture noise due
to the Great Recession, and the model might be matching Puerto Rico to counties that are
exclusively similar in terms of the Recession’s effects on them. Furthermore, the model might be
generating a control that is exclusively similar to Puerto Rico in terms of the variables I include
but is not representative of the economy in the absence of the intervention. Finally, IPTW can
generate artificially large weights that make the findings highly dependent on a handful of units;
though the general guidance is that weights should be stabilized to have a mean close to one,
there is no consensus on which winsorization level to use. I address these weaknesses and
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evaluate my findings robustness by presenting alternative specifications in the Robustness
Checks section.

Findings
Table 1 and Figure 4 present the point estimates for Acts 20 and 22’s effect on per capita
employment levels. The point estimates are positive but statistically insignificant in all years
except 2012. While I find significant evidence that Acts 20 and 22 caused a 2.6% increase in
employment in 2012 (i.e. immediately after their creation), my point estimates do not provide
any evidence suggesting this job creation was sustainable beyond 2012.
Table 2 and Figure 5 present the point estimates for the incentives’ effect on per capita
establishment counts. The point estimates are negative for all years in the post-intervention
period, and by 2016, I find that establishment counts were nearly -4.1% lower due to Acts 20 and
22. However, my matching-stage model fails to generate a high-quality counterfactual in terms
of establishments, as evidenced by pre-intervention coefficients that are significantly different
from zero. As such, it is not appropriate to assign a causal interpretation to these point estimates.
Table 3 and Figure 6 present the point estimates for Acts 20 and 22’s effect on wage
levels. While the results are statistically insignificant for 2012 to 2014, they provide statistically
significant evidence that Acts 20 and 22 reduced wages in 2015 and 2016 by -6.5% and -7.2%
respectively. This suggests that the jobs being created by Acts 20 and 22 are in low-wage
industries and not in the high-paying industries incentivized by the tax breaks.

Robustness Checks
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To address the concerns presented in the methods subsection, I explore the sensitivity of
my findings to the matching stage model-building process. Firstly, I test the baseline model’s
sensitivity to the period being used to calculate growth rates by instead matching on growth
between 2007 and 2011 and between 2009 and 2011. As seen in Figure 7, varying the period
over which I calculate the pre-intervention trends has no effect on the treatment effect point
estimates. This suggests the logit model is loading on predictors other than growth.
I then alter the predictors I include in the matching-stage model to assess whether the
results are sensitive to the variables I match on. I re-estimate weights using three sets of six
predictors in place of the original nine: 2011 values and growth trends; 2011 values and industry
mix; growth trends and industry mix. Figure 8 presents the results of this robustness check. The
findings for all the alternative models (except the one matched on 2011 values and industry mix)
are in-line with the baseline model’s results. The matching model built on 2011 values and
industry mix finds significant positive effects on wages in 2012 – 2014 and negative effect in
2015; it also finds statistically significant evidence of employment creation in all postintervention years and estimates that they increased employment by 9.1% by 2016; this model’s
findings for effect on establishment counts is in-line with the baseline model. However, this
model fails to eliminate pre-intervention differences between the counterfactual state and Puerto
Rico, since the coefficient estimates it generates for the pre-intervention period are statistically
different from zero. As such, it is not appropriate to assign a causal interpretation to its findings.
Finally, I re-evaluate the sensitivity to the weight winsorization process by winsorizing at
the 0%, 1%, and 2.5% levels. The model with no winsorization finds highly significant positive
effects in per capita employment for all years following the intervention. However, this model
fails to eliminate pre-intervention differences between Puerto Rico and the counterfactual, so it is
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not appropriate to assign a causal interpretation to these results. As seen in Figure 9,
winsorization at the 2.5% level yields similar results to the baseline model.

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services Model
While my baseline model does not find significant evidence of more than a minimal
impact on aggregate economic activity in Puerto Rico, I now explore its impact on the service
sector. Specifically, I focus on their collective effect on professional, scientific, and technical
services (NAICS 54). NAICS 54 was Puerto Rico’s third fastest growing industry in terms of
employment between 2011 and 2016, suggesting that these incentives might be successfully
impacting the service industry. Jobs within the sector are notably concentrated in areas such as
legal and accounting services, often used by the high-net-worth individuals targeted by Act 22.8
However, the most explicit linkage between the incentives and NAICS 54 comes through Act 20,
which specifically grants decrees to export-oriented service firms. During the intervention
period, the fastest growing industry group within NAICS 54 was management and technical
consulting services, specifically mentioned as one of the areas to be incentivized in Act 20’s
declaration of motives.9 While the data does show that the sector grew during the intervention
period, I estimate the incentives’ effect on services by running a synthetic difference-indifferences regression on Puerto Rico NAICS 54.

Methods

8

Legal and accounting services respectively represented 16.5% and 14.2% of employment in Puerto Rico NAICS
54 in 2016, per Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data.
9
Management and technical consulting services grew 20.7% of jobs in Puerto Rico NAICS 54 to 25.0% between
2011 and 2016, per Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data.
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I again use inverse probability of treatment weighting to create a counterfactual service
sector in Puerto Rico. I run the logit model on all NAICS 54 county-level observations in 2011
(i.e. prior to the intervention), matching on 2011 economic activity and growth between 2005
and 2011; since the sample consists of industry-specific observations, I do not include countylevel industry mix in the matching model. To minimize the effects of outliers on the results, I
again follow Cole and Hernan (2005) and winsorize weights at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce
the effect of outliers and achieve a mean weight close to one.
I then use these weights to estimate a weighted-least-squares regression. I regress the
natural logs of per-capita employment, annual establishment, and employment levels for each
county’s service sector on interaction terms between binary variables for being in Puerto Rico
NAICS 54 and dummy variables for each year. The model includes county and year fixed effects
to capture unobserved variations across counties and time. I cluster standard errors at the county
level and set alpha at the conventional level of 0.05.

Findings
Table 4 and Figure 10 present the treatment effect estimates for per capita employment in
Puerto Rico NAICS 54. The point estimates suggest that Acts 20 and 22 were successful in
creating jobs in the service sector at statistically significant levels. I find evidence that Acts 20
and 22 increased per capita employment in services in 2012–immediately after their creation–by
9.7%. Furthermore, I find evidence suggesting that there is consistent year-on-year growth in
per-capita employment and by 2016, this amounted to a 21.9% increase relative to 2011 levels.
Table 5 and Figure 11 present the treatment effect estimates for per capita establishments
in NAICS 54. The point estimates provide no statistically significant evidence that Acts 20 and
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22 had a significant effect on per capita establishments in the island. However, ITPW fails to
generate a high-quality synthetic control in terms of per capita establishments prior to the
intervention period, which makes it inappropriate to assign a causal interpretation.
Table 6 and Figure 12 present the treatment effect estimates for per capita wages in
NAICS 54. There is significant evidence that Acts 20 and 22 consistently increased per capita
wages on a year-over-year basis between 2012 and 2015. Per capita wages in 2012 were 9.4%
higher than in 2011 and peaked in 2015 when they were 19.7% higher than prior to the
intervention. By 2016, per capita annual wages had fallen to levels statistically indistinguishable
from pre-intervention levels.

Robustness Checks
I evaluate the findings’ sensitivity to the matching and winsorization process by
estimating the treatment effect on employment, establishment, and wages in the service sector
under different specifications. Firstly, I test sensitivity to the period I use to calculate growth
rates by instead matching on growth between 2007-2011 and 2009-2011. As seen in Figure 13,
the model’s findings are robust to these changes: adjusting the period over which I calculate
growth rates has no effect on the findings. Secondly, I evaluate sensitivity to the set of predictors
I use in the matching model. I present models matched solely on growth rates and on 2011 values
in Figure 14 and showing that my findings are robust to the set of predictors used. Finally, I
evaluate the impact of winsorization and present my results in Figure 15. The positive treatment
effect on employment and wages in services is robust to the winsorization process; though the
point estimates for the treatment effect on establishments are visibly different under a no
winsorization scenario when compared to the baseline, they also fail to provide evidence
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suggesting an effect on establishments. Thus, my findings for NAICS 54 are robust to variations
in growth rates, predictor sets, and winsorization.

CONCLUSION
Acts 20 and 22 represent another example of the Puerto Rican government’s use of fiscal
policy to incentivize business activity and stimulate its stagnating economy. Almost a decade
after their enactment, the government’s use of fiscal incentives has become increasingly
controversial. To further complicate the matter, a historical lack of accountability has made it
difficult to accurately carry out a cost-benefit analysis of existing incentive programs. Prior to
the creation of the Incentive Code of 2019, there were no mechanisms in place to assess these
programs’ tax expenditures nor to evaluate whether they are achieving their intended outcomes.
Though original estimates placed the cost of these programs at around $7 billion (Act 60-2019),
the Puerto Rico Tax Expenditure Report (PRTER) for FY2017 placed the actual cost of all
incentives at nearly $20 billion. This underscores both the substantial cost of these programs and
the difficulty of making policy assessments faced with a lack of oversight mechanisms.
Unlike government commissioned reports and Caraballo-Cueto (2021), I fail to find
evidence suggesting that Acts 20 and 22 effectively stimulated aggregate economic activity. My
estimates of the treatment effect on job creation are positive in all post-intervention years, but
these are not statistically significant at the 5% level beyond 2012. My results suggest that, by
2016, there were at most 36,052 jobs created, making the cost per job at least $3,891; the point
estimate suggests 5,608 jobs were created at a yearly cost per employment of $25,016.10
10

I estimate the number of jobs created as a percentage increase over 667,648 private, non-farm jobs in Puerto Rico
in 2011, as reported in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates the
average private, non-farm employment level in 2011 was 925,775. I follow the PRTER for FY2017 when estimating
the total cost of the two programs in 2016 at $140.3 million. I estimate the maximum number of jobs created using
the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval for the 2016 point estimate.

25

Furthermore, while Acts 20 and 22 intended to create jobs in high-paying export-oriented
industries, this study finds evidence suggesting they in fact reduced average wages in 2015 and
2016. This likely means the jobs created are in sectors with lower-than-average pay.
Furthermore, a substantial decrease in establishment counts suggests that Acts 20 and 22 might
be crowding out existing firms, and that job creation is being driven by a subset of firms rather
than an overall increase in the number of businesses.
While the intervention’s impact on the aggregate Puerto Rican economy is modest, I find
evidence that Acts 20 and 22 successfully incentivized economic activity in the service sector.
When creating Act 20, legislators sought to create export-oriented jobs in a wide range of areas,
including legal, accounting, consulting, and scientific services. Exploring the intervention’s
impact on NAICS 54 (professional, scientific, and technical services) reveals substantial growth
in per capita employment and wages. By 2015, the year in which the policies’ effects on the
service sector peaked, Acts 20 and 22 had caused a 23.1% increase in per capita employment and
19.7% increase in per capita wages. As such, Acts 20 and 22 were successful in incentivizing
professional services, but there is limited evidence that this growth had a meaningful impact on
the aggregate economy.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Figures
Figure 1.

Employment Growth Patterns (U.S. vs PR)

Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Employment change in Puerto Rico and the United States followed similar patterns prior to the
Great Recession. In the years following 2009, the United States has had positive year-on-year
employment growth in most years, whereas employment in Puerto Rico mostly contracts on a
year-on-year basis.
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Figure 2.

Puerto Rico Yearly Tax Collections Time Series

Source: Hacienda (Puerto Rico Department of Treasury)
There is significant volatility in the Puerto Rican government’s tax collections. Corporate
income tax represents approximately 20% of annual collections on average. Individual income
tax collections have also been trending downward since 2007.
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Figure 3.

Employment Change (vs. 2011) by Industry

Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Employment growth in Puerto Rico’s five largest industries in 2011 (retail trade; manufacturing;
healthcare; administrative and support; accommodation and food services) as well as
professional, scientific, and technical services (targeted by Acts 20 and 22) is presented for the
sample years and is benchmarked against other U.S. island jurisdictions.
Relative to 2011 levels, Puerto Rico demonstrates growth in all industries except manufacturing,
which has been steadily shrinking. Growth in NAICS 54 is substantial compared to other
jurisdictions.
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Figure 4.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Annual Employment

Relative to 2011 levels, the point estimates suggest Acts 20 and 22 caused positive but
statistically insignificant growth in per capita employment in Puerto Rico in all years between
2013 and 2016. A positive and significant estimated treatment effect in 2012 suggests that Acts
20 and 22 created jobs in the short term; the point estimates provide no statistically significant
evidence that this job growth was sustained.
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Figure 5.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Establishment Count

Relative to 2011 levels, the point estimates suggest Acts 20 and 22 caused negative growth in per
capita establishments in Puerto Rico in all years between 2012 and 2016. Significant treatment
effect estimates in the pre-intervention period suggest that the model fails to remove differences
between the treatment and control groups. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assign a causal
interpretation to these point estimates.
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Figure 6.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Annual Wages

The point estimates provide no statistically significant evidence that wages in 2012 and 2013
were different from pre-intervention levels. However, by 2014, the point estimate for the average
treatment effect on per capita annual wages is negative, suggesting that Acts 20 and 22 are
creating low-wage jobs.
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Figure 7.

Baseline Model Robustness Check: Varying Growth Rates

Similar point estimates for all three model suggest that the findings are insensitive to the growth
period being used in the matching process.
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Figure 8.

Baseline Model Robustness Check: Varying Predictors

Similar point estimates for all three model suggest that the findings are insensitive to the growth
period being used in the matching process.
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Figure 9.

Baseline Model Robustness Check: Varying Weight Winsorization

Though the findings are sensitive to weight winsorization levels, the model estimated with no
winsorization fails to control for pre-intervention differences between control and treatment, as
demonstrated by significant pre-intervention coefficient estimates.
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Figure 10.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Employment in NAICS 54

The point estimates suggest that Acts 20 and 22 had a positive and statistically significant effect
on per capita annual employment in the professional, scientific, and technical services sectors in
all years following their introduction.
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Figure 11.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Establishments in NAICS 54

The treatment effect estimates for establishment counts in NAICS 54 is positive but statistically
insignificant at the 95% confidence level for years between 2013 and 2016.
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Figure 12.

Treatment Effect on Per Capita Annual Wages in NAICS 54

The model suggests Acts 20 and 22 increased per capita wages in the service sector substantially
(relative to 2011 levels) in all years between 2012 and 2015. However, the point estimates do not
suggest that wages at the end of the period (i.e. 2016) were significantly different from 2011
levels.
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Figure 13.

NAICS 54 Model Robustness Check: Varying Growth Rates

Varying the period over which I calculate growth rates for the matching process has minimal
effects on my treatment estimates for NAICS 54.
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Figure 14.

NAICS 54 Model Robustness Check: Varying Predictors

Varying the predictor sets used to match and calculate weights has minimal effects on my
treatment estimates for NAICS 54.
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Figure 15.

NAICS 54 Model Robustness Check: Varying Weight Winsorization

Varying Winsorization levels for the weights has minimal effect on the treatment effect estimates
for employment and wages in NAICS 54. The estimated treatment effects for all models are inline with the baseline model point estimates.
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Appendix B: Regression Outputs
Table 1.

Per Capita Annual Employment Regression

-----------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_annual_avg_emplvl
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
407424
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
9.535e-05
R-Squared (Within)
-0.0002
R-Squared (Between)
-5.666e-05
R-Squared (Overall)
-5.954e-05
F-statistic
3.164e+04
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
======================
const
-4.6935***
(-2.077e+04)
2005_pr
-0.0278
(-1.2193)
2006_pr
-0.0055
(-0.2669)
2007_pr
0.0095
(0.4992)
2008_pr
-0.0023
(-0.1355)
2009_pr
0.0174
(1.3064)
2010_pr
0.0013
(0.1653)
2012_pr
0.0258***
(2.8124)
2013_pr
0.0193
(1.5214)
2014_pr
0.0135
(0.8463)
2015_pr
0.0021
(0.1061)
2016_pr
0.0075
(0.3248)
======================= ========================
Effects
Entity
Time
-----------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

Relative to 2011 levels, Acts 20 and 22 caused a significant increase in per capita employment.
However, the point estimates do not provide statistically significant evidence that this job
creation persisted beyond 2012, given positive but insignificant point estimates for 2013 – 2016.
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Table 2.

Per Capita Establishment Count Regression

-----------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_annual_avg_estabs
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
407424
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
0.0041
R-Squared (Within)
0.0056
R-Squared (Between)
-0.0002
R-Squared (Overall)
-9.555e-05
F-statistic
1.257e+05
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
======================
const
-6.9183***
(-5.625e+04)
2005_pr
0.0415***
(3.0950)
2006_pr
0.1065***
(8.2928)
2007_pr
0.1488***
(13.039)
2008_pr
0.0836***
(8.2947)
2009_pr
0.0014
(0.2087)
2010_pr
-0.0345***
(-8.2455)
2012_pr
-0.0267***
(-4.2852)
2013_pr
-0.0324***
(-3.7988)
2014_pr
-0.0434***
(-4.5670)
2015_pr
-0.0626***
(-5.1856)
2016_pr
-0.0412***
(-3.6374)
======================= ========================
Effects
Entity
Time
-----------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

The post-intervention point estimates for the treatment effect suggest Acts 20 and 22 caused
significant decreases in per capita annual establishments in Puerto Rico relative to 2011 levels.
However, significant coefficient estimates before 2011 indicate the model fails to eliminate preintervention differences in establishments between the treatment and control groups, so it is not
appropriate to assign a causal interpretation.
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Table 3.

Per Capita Annual Wages Regression

------------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_total_annual_wages
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
407424
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
0.0004
R-Squared (Within)
-0.0005
R-Squared (Between)
0.0004
R-Squared (Overall)
0.0004
F-statistic
3.362e+04
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
=======================
const
5.6522***
(2.402e+04)
2005_pr
-0.0519**
(-1.9954)
2006_pr
-0.0326
(-1.4042)
2007_pr
-0.0165
(-0.7618)
2008_pr
-0.0058
(-0.3004)
2009_pr
0.0346**
(2.3747)
2010_pr
0.0074
(0.8630)
2012_pr
0.0133
(1.3030)
2013_pr
-0.0055
(-0.3946)
2014_pr
-0.0311*
(-1.8256)
2015_pr
-0.0647***
(-3.3704)
2016_pr
-0.0722***
(-3.4321)
======================= =========================
Effects
Entity
Time
------------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

The point estimates suggest that Acts 20 and 22 caused significant decreases in per capita annual
wages in Puerto Rico in 2015 and 2016.

48

Table 4.

Per Capita Annual Employment in NAICS 54 Regression

-----------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_annual_avg_emplvl
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
16524
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
0.0271
R-Squared (Within)
0.0302
R-Squared (Between)
-0.0094
R-Squared (Overall)
-0.0079
F-statistic
2.269e+04
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
======================
const
-4.6870***
(-1671.2)
2005_pr
-0.0634
(-0.6100)
2006_pr
-0.0954
(-1.1149)
2007_pr
-0.0300
(-0.3602)
2008_pr
-0.1168
(-1.0268)
2009_pr
0.0064
(0.1062)
2010_pr
-0.0051
(-0.1210)
2012_pr
0.0967***
(4.9792)
2013_pr
0.1286***
(3.1557)
2014_pr
0.1583***
(3.0881)
2015_pr
0.2314***
(3.6094)
2016_pr
0.2190***
(2.7282)
======================= ========================
Effects
Entity
Time
-----------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

Acts 20 and 22 caused significant job creation in NAICS 54 (professional, scientific, and
technical services). Relative to 2011 levels, per capita employment grew on a year-by-year basis
in all years between 2012 and 2015, and the treatment effect estimate remains positive but
slightly lower than the previous year in 2016.
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Table 5.

Per Capita Annual Establishments in NAICS 54 Regression

-----------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_annual_avg_estabs
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
16524
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
0.0196
R-Squared (Within)
0.0259
R-Squared (Between)
-0.0095
R-Squared (Overall)
-0.0087
F-statistic
1.523e+05
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
======================
const
-6.2869***
(-3548.7)
2005_pr
-0.0070
(-0.1216)
2006_pr
0.0513
(1.0427)
2007_pr
0.1012**
(2.5467)
2008_pr
0.0366
(1.3550)
2009_pr
-0.0393*
(-1.8396)
2010_pr
-0.0601***
(-3.8616)
2012_pr
-0.0067
(-0.2647)
2013_pr
0.0290
(0.9538)
2014_pr
0.0413
(0.8712)
2015_pr
0.0879
(1.4545)
2016_pr
0.0983
(1.5999)
======================= ========================
Effects
Entity
Time
-----------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

Post-intervention point estimates provide no significant evidence that Acts 20 and 22 had an
effect on per capita establishment count in NAICS 54 (professional, scientific, and technical
services).
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Table 6.

Per Capita Annual Wages in NAICS 54 Regression

------------------------------------------------Dep. Variable
pc_total_annual_wages
Estimator
PanelOLS
No. Observations
16524
Cov. Est.
Clustered
R-squared
0.0148
R-Squared (Within)
0.0334
R-Squared (Between)
-0.0041
R-Squared (Overall)
-0.0026
F-statistic
2.324e+04
P-value (F-stat)
0.0000
=====================
=======================
const
5.9908***
(1564.0)
2005_pr
-0.0392
(-0.2715)
2006_pr
-0.0937
(-0.8251)
2007_pr
-0.0213
(-0.2183)
2008_pr
-0.1401
(-1.0119)
2009_pr
-0.0464
(-0.5207)
2010_pr
-0.0670
(-0.8540)
2012_pr
0.0937**
(2.5094)
2013_pr
0.1297**
(2.4250)
2014_pr
0.1429**
(2.4215)
2015_pr
0.1966***
(2.7347)
2016_pr
0.1424
(1.3973)
======================= =========================
Effects
Entity
Time
------------------------------------------------* : p < .10 | ** : p < 0.05 | *** : p < 0.01

The point estimates provide significant evidence that Acts 20 and 22 increased wages in NAICS
54 (professional, scientific, and technical services) in all years between 2012 and 2015, relative
to 2011 levels.
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